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Subverting New Media for Profit: How
Online Social Media 'Black Markets'
Violate Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act
by PETER TOUSCHNER*
I. Introduction
The first decade of the twenty-first century saw a shift in the
media environment occupied by the average consumer as the mass
media paradigm that dominated the twentieth century began to
compete with new forms of "social media" for consumer attention.'
Social media can be broadly defined as "a category of sites that is
based on user participation and user-generated content."2 Prominent
social media sites include Facebook, YouTube, Delicious, Digg,
Reddit, and Twitter. By the end of 2008, two-thirds of the world
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2011; B.A.
with Honors, English, Oberlin College, 2004. The author would like to thank the editors
and staff of HSTLJ for their continuing dedication and hard work.
1. Professor Yochai Benkler identifies the movement from mass media to social
media as reflecting fundamental changes with respect to two distinct elements: network
architecture and "the cost of becoming a speaker." Benkler explains:
The first element is the shift from a hub-and-spoke architecture with
unidirectional links to the end points in the mass media, to distributed
architecture with multidirectional connections among all nodes in the networked
information environment. The second is the practical elimination of
communications costs as a barrier to speaking across associational boundaries.
Together, these characteristics have fundamentally altered the capacity of
individuals, acting alone or with others, to be active participants in the public
sphere as opposed to its passive readers, listeners, or viewers.
YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 212 (Yale University Press 2007).
2. Search Enginge Watch SEM Glossary, http://searchenginewatch.com/define (last
visited March 12, 2010).
[165]
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Internet population visited social media sites. In the U.S., interaction
on such sites accounts for nearly a quarter of all time spent on the
Internet, topping email and games as the most popular online
activity. Total advertising on social media sites in the U.S. is
projected to increase from $1.68 billion in 2010 to an estimated $2.09
billion in 2011.'
In contrast with mass media, social media empowers users to
become active participants in shaping both their own experience of
the medium, and the experience of all other users. Indeed, the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commission") has identified
the phenomenon of "consumers creating and publishing their own
content [and] not merely being passive recipients of professionally
produced content" as one of the most important developments of the
last decade.'
The Commission similarly has recognized that social media
participants often become trusted sources of consumer information
for one another as they "write their opinions, review products and
services, offer information, and in general, narrate their life
experience" for one another online.' The result is a blurring of the
boundaries between consumer, producer, and advertiser which has
introduced new challenges for combating potentially unfair or
deceptive trade practices. For example, in the context of blogger
endorsements of products and services, the FTC has opined:
Consumers who endorse and recommend products on their
blogs or other sites for consideration should do so within the
boundaries set forth in the FTC Guides Concerning Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising and the FTC's
guidance on word of mouth marketing. Consumers reading
endorsements and recommendations from other consumers
reasonably expect that these represent the endorser's actual
3. Global Faces and Networked Places, Nielsen Report on Social Networking's New
Global Footprint (March 2009), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/wp-content/uploads
/2009/03/nielsen-globalfaces mar09.pdf.
4. Nielson.com, What Americans Do Online: Social Media And Games Dominate
Activity (Aug. 2,2010),http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online-mobile/what-americans-
do-online-social-media-and-games-dominate-activity/.
5. Flowtown.com, The Rise of Social Network Ad Spending (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://www.flowtown.com/blog/the-rise-of-social-network-ad-spending?display=wide.
6. PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE NEXT TECH-ADE: A REPORT BY THE STAFF
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, at 3 (March 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008
/03/PO64101tech.pdf.
7. Id.
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experiences and that the experiences described are those
typically obtained by use of the endorsed product or service.
Ensuring that consumer-producers who engage in activities to
market and advertise products for consideration do so within
the confines of laws prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in trade will require new strategies for education and
enforcement.
Additionally, in response to the rise of social media, the FTC has
recently revised and updated its Guides Concerning the Use of
Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising ("Guides") to
specifically address disclosure requirements for bloggers and other
social media participants.
Given the rise of social media and its increasing influence over
consumer market choices, a few firms have sought to game social
media systems by setting up "black markets" for social media votes
and actions. These firms act as middlemen, charging advertiser
partners for specified social media outcomes-such as a certain
number of votes that may result in prominent placement on a social
media site-and paying real, otherwise legitimate, social media
participants directly to achieve those results.10
This Note will examine Section 5 of the FTC Act ("Section 5"),
the FTC's Policy Statement on Deception, and the newly revised FTC
Guides as they relate to such undercover social media marketing
techniques. I will argue that Section 5 is broad enough and flexible
enough to encompass such "black markets" in its definition of "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."
II. Background: Emerging 'Black Markets' in Social Media
Votes and Actions
While at least two other firms 2 have attempted to introduce and
administer "black markets" for social media votes and actions, the
8. PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE NEXT TECH-ADE, supra note 7 (footnotes
omitted).
9. 16 C.F.R. § 255 (2009).
10. Loren Baker, Pay for Diggs: Subvert & Profit (April 3, 2007), http://www.search
enginejournal.com/pay-for-diggs-subvert-profit/4650/.
11. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-254 (excluding P.L. 111-
203, 111-240, and 111 -249)).
12. Two other such services, both now defunct, were User/Sumbitter and Spike the
Vote. See Michael Arrington, Next Service To Try Gaming Digg: Subvert and Profit
(April 2, 2007), http://techcrunch.com/2007/04/02/subvert-and-profit-next-service-to-try-
gaming-digg.
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most sophisticated current incarnation is Subvert and Profit.com.
Billing itself as "the easiest way to make money online and the
cheapest form of advertising in the web 2.0 sphere," Subvert and
Profit has created a streamlined system whereby advertisers seeking
to promote content, products, or services can purchase specified
social media votes and actions at prices ranging from $0.40 to $1.00
per vote or action. Subvert and Profit then pays social media
participants approximately one-half this amount in exchange for the
participant's verified completion of the specified vote or action,
keeping the remainder for itself.14
Subvert and Profit's chief innovation-and perhaps the reason
social media sites such as Digg.com perceive it as a threat"-is the
ease with which social media participants can quickly set up accounts
and begin getting paid for their site activity. With nothing more than
an AlertPay16 account, the Firefox web browser, and a valid account
with one of the twenty-four (24) different social media platforms" in
which Subvert and Profit operates, a social media user can begin
getting paid for his or her site activity almost immediately. Subvert
and Profit employs a special add-on to the Firefox browser that
notifies users when there are new votes or actions for which they can
receive compensation." A user who installs Subvert and Profit's
browser toolbar can go about his or her daily online activities-
perhaps participating in social media legitimately and without
compensation-and await notification through the toolbar that there
are social media votes or actions for which he or she can receive
compensation." Upon notification, the social media participant can
perform the specified actions and then use the toolbar to verify with
Subvert and Profit that he or she has completed those actions. After
verification, the user's AlertPay account is automatically credited at
the going rate for that particular vote or action.2 0
13. Subvert and Profit, http://subvertandprofit.com/ (last visisted March 12, 2010).
14. Appendix, Fig. 1.
15. Digg has been attempting to identify and remove Subvert and Profit activity from
Digg since Subvert and Profit was founded in April 2007. See Patrick Altoft, Subvert and
Profit Gets Busted (July 30, 2007), http://www.blogstorm.co.uk/subvert-and-profit-busted/.
16. AlertPay is a secure online payment service similar to PayPal.
17. Appendix, Fig. 2.
18. Appendix, Fig. 3.
19. Id.
20. Appendix, Fig. 1.
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Subvert and Profit claims over 25,000 unique, anonymous users
actively engaged in paid social media activity.21 On a site like Digg,
for example, it takes approximately 60-120 votes for content to reach
the front page of the site. Content that reaches the front page of
Digg can receive tens of thousands of unique viewers in a matter of
hours.2 An advertiser seeking to promote its content, product, or
service can thus reach tens of thousands of viewers simply by
purchasing the requisite number of Digg "votes" through Subvert and
Profit.24 Visitors to Digg have no way of distinguishing content that
makes it to the front page, in whole or in part, through Subvert and
Profit votes versus content that makes it the front page wholly
through legitimate "diggs."
Similarly, on Facebook an advertiser can use Subvert and Profit
to purchase a "wall post" from a Facebook user that links to the
advertiser's content.25 An advertiser can also pay to have a Facebook
user "fan" the advertiser's Facebook page.26  Depending on each
user's settings, these acts can result in the message being propagated
to all of the Facebook user's "friends" as a personalized endorsement
of the advertiser's content.
Subvert and Profit functions similarly on the other social media
platforms in which it operates. On the movie review site Flixster, for
example, Subvert and Profit sells five-star movie ratings.2 On the
music site iLike, it sells user recommendations of specific songs which
iLike participants can then purchase directly.28 On video sites such as
21. Michael Arrington, Next Service To Try Gaming Digg: Subvert and Profit,
TechCrunch (April 2, 2007), http://techcrunch.com/2007/04/02/subvert-and-profit-next-
service-to-try-gaming-digg/.
22. Themelis Cuiper, Next Target for Subvert and Profit: StumbleUpon (Feb. 25,
2010), http://themelis-cuiper.com/stumbleupon/next-target-for-subvert-and-profit-
stumbleupon.html.
23. Mark Milian, Usocial CEO: 'We're Gaming Digg' (March 5, 2009), http://latimes
blogs.latimes.com/technology/2009/03/usocial-digg.html.
24. Digg users are also able to vote to "bury" content they believe should not make it
to Digg's front page. Subvert and Profit screens content submitted by advertisers and
often rejects overtly "spammy" content on the ground that Digg users are likely to "bury"
it. In practice, Subvert and Profit is often used by advertisers to gain an initial number of
votes on their content with the hope that after this initial push up in the rankings, the
content will subsequently receive legitimate, organic "diggs" which will propel it to the
front page. See Tamar Weinberg, 'Subvert and Profit' Profits No One (July 25, 2007),
http://www.techipedia.com/2007/subvert-and-profit/.
25. Appendix, Fig. 4.
26. Id.
27. Appendix, Fig. 5.
28. Appendix, Fig. 6.
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YouTube, Yahoo! Video, DailyMotion, MetaCafe, and LiveVideo,
Subvert and Profit pays social users to "favorite" videos so that they
are more likely to get placed on the front page or "popular" sections
of each respective site.29 On Twitter, an advertiser can pay for the
privilege of having a Twitter user "tweet" a specific link or phrase to
all of his or her "followers." Alternatively, the advertiser can pay to
have the user to subscribe to its Twitter feed." Finally, Subvert and
Profit also caters to niche social media sites such as Dzone for web
developers and Sphinn for Internet marketing professionals.' By
leveraging the accounts of trusted users on these sites, Subvert and
Profit's advertisers are able to promote their content, product, or
service to highly targeted professional audiences.
While reliable earnings reports for Subvert and Profit are
unavailable, all indications are that the business has been growing
since its inception in April 2007. The site began as a "black market"
solely for Digg votes and has steadily expanded, first to
StumbleUpon.com, and eventually to a total of twenty-four (24)
different social media platforms.32 The company reports that its "ad
vote volume" doubled from third quarter 2008 to third quarter 2009."
Moreover, Subvert and Profit's success has led to other firms
offering similar undercover marketing services for social media
platforms. USocial.net, for example, offers to place advertiser
content on the front page of social media sites such as Digg,
Delicious, and Reddit for fees ranging from $250 to $600. It also
offers to "buy" Facebook "friends" and Twitter "followers" for
advertisers. While uSocial is more secretive than Subvert and Profit
with respect to how it goes about achieving these outcomes for
advertisers, news reports indicate that, like Subvert and Profit, it
employs a network of social media participants whom it pays directly
to perform specified social media votes and actions.
29. Appendix, Fig. 7.
30. Appendix, Fig. 8.
31. Appendix, Fig. 9.
32. Themelis Cuiper, supra note 22; Appendix, Fig. 2.
33. Subvert and Profit Reports 114% Growth In Social Media Vote Volume, SUBVERT
ANDPROFIT.COM (Oct. 7, 2009), http://subvertandprofit.com/blog /2009/10/07/subvert-and
-profit-reports- 114-growth-in-social-media-vote-volume/.
34. USOCIAL, http://usocial.net/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
35. Id.
36. See Milian, supra note 23.
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Social media "black markets" remain a largely under-the-radar
phenomenon and have yet to garner the widespread user base that
would seriously undermine the consumer value of social media
systems. However, the steady growth of businesses such as Subvert
and Profit and uSocial, as well as the increased sophistication of the
techniques they employ, indicates that large-scale interference with
social media systems-both in terms of the systems as they exist today
and in terms of imposing barriers to further innovation-is a real
threat.
As one example, consider Google's recent purchase of little-
known "social search engine" Aardvark for $50 million." Aardvark
uses an array of complex algorithms to analyze a user's network of
online friends in an attempt to match a user query to the specific
individual within the user's extended social network who is
particularly suited to answering the query in real time.3" Aardvark
then connects the two users in a live chat interface. 9 The Aardvark
service remains in the early stages of its development and it is unclear
how successful it will prove in the long run. However, one thing is
clear: a social media "black market" such as Subvert and Profit is
capable of crippling Aardvark's development before the service even
gets off the ground. That is, by paying Aardvark users to respond to
questions posed through the system with messages and links chosen
by advertisers, Subvert and Profit-or any other firm successfully
administering a large scale "black market" in social media votes or
action-can seriously undermine the foundation of user trust which is
essential to the development of innovative social media systems.
III. The FTC's Broad Statutory Mandate to Regulate Deceptive
Trade Practices
Founded in 1915, the FTC is an independent federal agency with
authority to investigate and prosecute unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, including deceptive advertising.
When the FTC has reason to believe that any person, partnership, or
37. Michael Arrington, Google Acquires Aardvark For $50 million (Confirmed),
TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 11, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/02/11/google-acquires-aard
vark-for-50-million/.
38. See Damon Horowitz and Sepandar D. Kamvar, Anatomy of a Large-Scale Social
Search Engine (Apr. 26-30, 2010), http://vark.com/aardvarkFinalWWW2010.pdf.
39. Id.
40. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-254 (excluding P.L. 111-203,
111 -240, and 111-249)).
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corporation is engaged in deceptive advertising practices, it has
authority under the FTC Act to issue a complaint, hold a hearing,
and, if it determines that a violation of the Act has occurred, issue a
cease and desist order.4' Parties may appeal such orders in federal
court.42 Violation of an FTC cease and desist order, as determined by
either the FTC or a federal court of competent jurisdiction, may
* * * * 43
result in civil penalties and a permanent injunction.
Upon its inception, the FTC was largely seen as an agency tasked
44
with investigating and prosecuting antitrust violations. For many
years after its inception, it was unclear whether the FTC had the
power to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices wholly unrelated
to antitrust concerns. 45 However, the Supreme Court dispelled this
confusion in 1972 when it substantially broadened its interpretation of
the FTC's statutory mandate in Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Co. 46
In Sperry, the Fifth Circuit below had held that Section 5 of the
FTC Act only permits the FTC to regulate those deceptive trade
practices which violate "the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws."47 In
reversing, the Court held that the FTC's congressional mandate is
much more broad and that Congress intended the FTC to protect not
just firm competition, but also individual consumers, against unfair or
deceptive trade practices.4
Moreover, in making its ruling, the Court rejected the notion that
the definition of "unfair or deceptive trade acts or practices" under
the FTC Act can be reduced to a rigid list of specifically prohibited
practices.49 The Court cited the 1914 congressional record as proof
that Congress intended the FTC to exercise great flexibility in making
determinations as to which trade practices will be deemed unfair or
deceptive under Section 5." Congress had stated:
41. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 111-254 (excluding P.L. 111-203,
111-240, and 111-249)).
42. Id. § 45(d).
43. Id. § 45(1).
44. Brooke E. Crescenti, Comment, Undercover Marketing: If Omission is the
Mission, Where is the Federal Trade Commission?, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 699, 703 (2006).
45. Id. at 704-05.
46. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
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The committee gave careful consideration to the question as to
whether it would attempt to define the many and variable
unfair practices which prevail in commerce and to forbid their
continuance or whether it would, by a general declaration
condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to
determine what practices were unfair. It concluded that the
latter course would be the better, for the reason, as stated by
one of the representatives of the Illinois Manufacturers'
Association, that there were too many unfair practices to
define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be
quite possible to invent others."
The Court went on to reject "judicial attempts to fence in the
grounds upon which the FTC might rest a finding of unfairness."-2
Instead, the Court acknowledged the FTC's "broad powers to declare
trade practices unfair" and advocated a flexible approach that allows
the FTC to respond to changing circumstances in determining what
constitutes a Section 5 violation." As such, the FTC has a certain
degree of leeway in determining whether "black markets" in social
media votes and action are a deceptive trade practice.
IV. Social Media 'Black Markets' Violate Section 5 Given the
FTC's Policy Statement on Deception
Without in any way limiting its broad and flexible statutory
powers, in 1983 the FTC issued a General Policy Statement on
Deception ("Policy Statement").54 The Policy Statement provides
guidance to both FTC officials and the general public on the types of
trade practices that will be deemed deceptive and therefore unlawful
under Section 5.5 While the Policy Statement does not have the force
of binding law, it is intended to clarify the circumstances in which the
FTC will seek corrective action under Section 5.5'
51. Sperry, 405 U.S. at 239-40 (citing Senate Report No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., 13
(1914)).
52. Id. at 241.
53. Id.; see also FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953)
(advocating a flexible approach to the FTC's mandate under Section 5).
54. FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), appended to In re Cliffdale
Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/oia/assistance/consumer
protection/advertising/policy-deception.pdf.
55. Id.
56. FTC Operating Manual ch. 3.1.2.1, available at http://www.ftc.gov/foia/ch03
investigations.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2010).
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The Policy Statement lays out three factors that must be
analyzed to determine whether a particular trade practice is unfair or
deceptive under Section 5. The factors are: (1) a representation or
omission which is likely to mislead the consumer, (2) the
reasonableness of the consumer's reaction to the representation or
omission, and (3) the materiality of the representation or omission in
terms of whether it is "likely to affect the consumer's conduct or
decision with regard to a product or service."
With respect to the first factor, actual deception is not required.)
The FTC need only show that the representation or omission is likely
to mislead consumers."' In turn, the reasonableness of the consumer's
reaction to the representation or omission is to be determined from
the total impression the advertisement creates in the mind of the
consumer, not by isolating words or phrases within the
advertisement.'
Before applying these factors to social media "black markets"
such as Subvert and Profit, there is a preliminary question as to
whether paid votes and actions on social media sites constitute
"advertising" such that they are within the FTC's statutory mandate.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "advertising" as "[t]he action of
drawing the public's attention to something to promote its sale." 62
Obviously, firms that purchase social media votes through Subvert
and Profit do so because they are attempting to draw attention,
whether directly or indirectly, to particular content, products, or
services. Moreover, Subvert and Profit specifically refers to such
firms as "advertisers."" Subvert and Profit also markets itself by
offering to "Place Ads in Social Media." 64 It thus stands to reason
that firms who take up Subvert and Profit's offer to "place ads" in
social media in order to promote their products or services are
engaged in a form advertising, and thus subject to FTC regulation.
57. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. Resort Rental Car Sys. Inc. v. FTC, 518 F.2d 962, 964 (1975) (holding that actual
deception need not be shown).
60. In re Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 111 (Mar. 23, 1984).
61. Amn. Home Products Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982).
62. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 59 (8th ed. 2004); see also Courtesy Oldsmobile v.
General Motors, 329 Fed. Appx. 73, 76 (9th Cir. 2009).
63. Appendix, Fig. 10.
64. Appendix, Fig. 11.
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Applying the factors outlined above, then, it is clear that
advertisers who purchase social media votes and actions through
Subvert and Profit are engaged in a deceptive practice. First, there is
an omission which is likely to mislead consumers-namely, the
omission of the fact that the social media votes or actions were paid
for by an advertiser as opposed to motivated by social media
participants' legitimate interest in the particular content. Any person
who visits Digg has no way of distinguishing content that made it to
the front page based on legitimate "diggs" from content that made it
there, in whole or in part, as a result of "diggs" paid for by Subvert
and Profit advertisers. The average consumer is likely to be misled
because he or she is operating under the assumption that all of the
content on the site is there as a result of aggregate endorsement of a
community of legitimate "diggers."
Similarly, when a "wall post" from a friend shows up on a
Facebook user's "News Feed," there is an omission of the fact that
the post is not a friend's honest opinion about something the friend
independently chose to share, but is in fact an advertisement placed
through Subvert and Profit. The same holds true for sponsored
"tweets" on Twitter, sponsored song recommendations on iLike, and
"favorited" videos on YouTube.
With respect to the second factor, the consumer's reaction to the
omission is clearly reasonable in each case. There is no disclosure by
the advertiser, Subvert and Profit, or the social media participant that
a particular "tweet," Facebook message, or Digg vote has been
bought and paid for by an advertiser. The reasonable consumer has
no way of knowing that he or she is even being engaged by an
advertiser rather than communicating with a fellow social media
participant or, in the case of Digg, the collective voice of many social
media participants. Indeed, the message is reasonably construed by
the average consumer as the independent endorsement of a trusted
friend or group of friends. It is this ability to trade off on the goodwill
and seeming independence of social media participants that makes
undercover social media marketing so appealing to advertisers in the
first place.
Finally, with respect to the Policy Statement's third factor, the
omission is plainly material.6' The omission leads the average
consumer to believe that the advertising message is not an
advertisement at all, but rather a personal message coming from a
65. FTC Policy Statement on Deception, supra note 54.
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friend or from an aggregation of fellow social media participants
motivated not by compensation, but by legitimate interest in the
subject matter. As such, consumers are more likely to pay attention
to the advertising message and are more likely to be influenced by it.
Thus, all three factors outlined in the FTC's Policy Statement militate
in favor of a finding that social media "black markets" constitute a
deceptive trade practice under Section 5.
V. Social Media 'Black Markets' Violate Section 5 Given the
FTC's Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising
Even if the FTC's Policy Statement on Deception did not
support a finding that social media "black markets" constitute a
deceptive trade practice under Section 5, the FTC has provided
further guidance in Section 255 of Title 16 of the Code of Federal
Regulations which constitutes independent grounds for such a
finding.6 The Guides are a specification of those trade practices the
FTC will deemdeceptive under Section 5 in the context of commercial
endorsements." They are designed to "provide the basis for
voluntary compliance with the law by advertisers and endorsers,"
though the FTC makes sure to note that the Guides neither expand
nor limit the FTC's statutory mandate under Section 5."
The Guides define circumstances in which a particular message
will be deemed to constitute a commercial endorsement and explains
when the relationship between an endorser and an advertiser must be
disclosed in order to avoid a Section 5 violation."' Section 255.0
defines "endorsement" as:
any advertising message . . . that consumers are likely to believe
reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or experiences of a party
other than the sponsoring advertiser, even if the views
expressed by that party are identical to those of the sponsoring
advertiser. The party whose opinions, beliefs, findings, or
66. 16 C.F.R. § 255 (West, Westlaw through October 7, 2010).
67. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, NOTICE ANNOUNCING ADOPTION OF REVISED
GUIDES at 10 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/10/091005endorsementguide
sfnnotice.pdf.
68. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.
69. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 67.
70. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.
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experience the message appears to reflect will be called the
endorser and may be an individual, group, or institution.
Section 255.0 goes on to set forth eight hypothetical situations
and explains whether each constitutes an endorsement under the
Guides.72 For example, a film critic's review of a movie, when
excerpted in an advertisement, constitutes an endorsement because it
is "viewed by readers as a statement of the critic's own opinions." A
television commercial in which two unidentified and unknown women
discuss laundry detergent, on the other hand, does not constitute an
endorsement because it is an "obvious fictional dramatization of a
real life situation." 74  Similarly, an advertisement in which an
otherwise unknown announcer extols the virtues of a pain remedy
does not constitute an endorsement because he "purports to speak,
not on the basis of his own opinions, but rather in the place of and on
behalf of the drug company."7 A consumer who raves about a new,
expensive brand of dog food on her blog who does not otherwise have
an affiliation with the dog food company has not endorsed the
product within the meaning of the Guides.76 However, if the same
consumer joins a "network marketing program" and receives a free
bag of the new dog food from the company as a result, her subsequent
positive review of the dog food constitutes an endorsement.
These examples show that the determining factor is whether,
based on the total impression of the advertisement, a reasonable
consumer is likely to believe that the opinions expressed are those of
someone other than the sponsoring advertiser. However, with
respect to the consumer's positive review of dog food on her blog, the
review is presented as her own opinion and not that of the dog food
company whether she participated in a network marketing program
or not. The review becomes an endorsement under the Guides only
when there is a material connection between the consumer and the
dog food company. In the example, the material connection is the
consumer's participation in the network marketing program and the
fact that she received a free bag of the dog food through the
71. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.
72. Id.
73. Id. at Example 1.
74. Id. at Example 2.
75. Id. at Example 3.
76. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0, Example 8.
77. Id.
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program.78 The FTC's Notice of Adoption of the Revised Guides
("Notice") clarifies this point by identifying "sponsorship" of a
message as the fundamental issue in the context of social media
endorsements.7 The FTC explains:
[I]n analyzing statements made via these new media, the
fundamental question is whether, viewed objectively, the
relationship between the advertiser and the speaker is such that
the speaker's statement can be considered "sponsored" by the
advertiser and therefore an "advertising message." In other
words, in disseminating positive statements about a product or
service, is the speaker: (1) acting solely independently, in which
case there is no endorsement, or (2) acting on behalf of the
advertiser or its agent, such that the speaker's statement is an
"endorsement" that is part of an overall marketing campaign?so
The Guides go on to state in Section 255.5 that any connection
between an endorser and the seller of an advertised product which
'might materially affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement"
must be fully disclosed." Thus, taking up the previous example, the
blogger's receipt of the free bag of dog food makes her subsequent
blog post on the subject an "endorsement" under the Guides.
Because knowledge that the blogger had received free dog food
would materially affect the credibility the average consumer would
assign to the review, the fact of its receipt must be fully disclosed.
Failure to disclose such a material connection constitutes a deceptive
trade practice under Section 5.82
On December 1, 2009, the FTC adopted a revised version of the
Guides, adding Example 8 to Section 255.0 discussed above, as well as
new example situations to Section 255.5 . The FTC intended each
new example to clarify confusion regarding the FTC's position on
consumer-generated endorsements in the social media context.84 For
instance, the FTC revised Example 3 in Section 255.5 to include the
hypothetical situation where a well-known professional tennis player
who is being paid by a medical clinic to speak positively about the
78. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0, Example 8.
79. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 67.
80. Id.
81. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.
82. Id. § 255.0.
83. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 8.
84. Id. at 12.
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clinic during public appearances also touts the clinic on a social
networking site.> The Guides explain that given "the nature of the
medium in which her endorsement is disseminated, consumers might
not realize that she is a paid endorser" and so the relationship must
be disclosed because "that information might affect the weight
consumers give to her endorsement.""
Similarly, the revised Guides include a new example in which an
employee of a company that manufactures MP3 players promotes the
company's MP3 players on an online message board.8  Because
knowledge of the poster's affiliation with the MP3 company would
affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement, the relationship
should be "clearly and conspicuously" disclosed to readers of the
message board."
Finally, the FTC added Example 7 describing a college student
who has earned a reputation as an expert in video games." When a
video game company provides a free video game system to the
student and asks him to write about it on his blog, the student must
"clearly and conspicuously" disclose this fact to his readers because
the "review is disseminated via a form of consumer-generated media
in which his relationship to the advertiser is not inherently obvious"
and knowledge of the relationship would materially affect the
credibility consumers attach to his endorsement." Moreover, the
video game company should advise the student at the time the
gaming system is provided that he should disclose its receipt in his
blog post and, furthermore, it is incumbent upon the company to set
up procedures to monitor the student's blog posts for compliance.1
The FTC's Notice further explains the responsibility of endorsers
to disclose material connections as well as the responsibility of
advertisers to take steps to ensure that the required disclosure takes
place:
The recent creation of consumer-generated media means that in
many instances, endorsements are disseminated by an endorser,
rather than by the sponsoring advertiser. In these contexts, the
85. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5, Example 3.
86. Id.
87. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5, Example 8.
88. Id.
89. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5, Example 7.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Commission believes that the endorser is the party primarily
responsible for disclosing material connections with the
advertiser. However, advertisers who sponsor these endorsers
(either by providing free products - directly or through
middlemen - or otherwise) in order to generate positive word
of mouth and spur sales should establish procedures to advise
endorsers that they should make the necessary disclosures and
to monitor the conduct of those endorsers.92
Applying these standards to "black markets" in social media
votes and actions, the initial question is whether paid social media
votes or actions constitute an "endorsement" under the Guides.
Clearly, when an advertiser uses Subvert and Profit to pay a Twitter
user to "tweet" about its product, or a Facebook user to post about
the product on his or her "wall," the message is an endorsement
under the Guides. In each case, there is a relationship between the
social media user and the advertiser which is unknown and
unknowable to the consumers who see the message, and consumers
are likely to believe that the message reflects the opinion of the social
media user as opposed to the sponsoring advertiser. Indeed, the
very purpose of undercover marketing is to trick consumers into
believing they are engaged in an authentic interaction with a fellow
consumer when in fact they are hearing a sponsored advertisement.94
Moreover, paid social networking messages are analytically
indistinguishable from some of the hypotheticals in the Guides where
the FTC found an endorsement had occurred, such as the tennis
player paid to advertise for the clinic on a social networking site," an
employee paid to write positive comments about his company's MP3
players on Internet message boards," or bloggers paid to blog with
free dog food9 or video game systems. 8  It is thus clear that the
fundamental question for endorsements in the social media context-
whether the speaker's statement can be considered "sponsored" by
92. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 67.
93. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0.
94. Brooke E. Crescenti, Comment, Undercover Marketing: If Omission is the
Mission, Where is the Federal Trade Commission?, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 699, 703 (2006).
95. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0, Example 3.
96. 16 C.F.R. § 255.0, Example 8.
97. Id.
98. Id. at Example 7.
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the advertiser9"-must be answered in the affirmative for "black
markets" in "tweets" and Facebook messages.
A more difficult question is whether a paid vote on aggregator
sites such Digg constitutes an endorsement under the Guides. On
one hand, the act of "digging" an article, video, or image, in and of
itself, appears to be far removed from promoting a product or service
via an advertising message. Legitimate Digg users "digg" content on
the web that they find interesting. "Digging" content is the social
media equivalent of a crowd of people standing in a public square
where people are known to congregate, holding out pamphlets, and
saying to each person who walks by, "Check this out. This is
interesting." It may be an "endorsement" of the material in the
pamphlet in the most general sense of the term, but it is not
necessarily an endorsement of a specific product or service through
an advertising message. On the other hand, a paid "digg" on a social
media "black market" like Subvert and Profit is attempting to
promote a specific product or service-namely, whatever product or
service the advertiser is seeking to promote through the promotion of
the content to be "dugg." A paid "digg" is thus the equivalent of
crowds of pamphleteers located in the same public square who are
paid to hand out pamphlets that, directly or indirectly, promote the
sale of products or services..o When the advertiser is trading off on
the reputation and seeming independence of the "pamphleteer," as is
the case when a seemingly independent-minded "digger" promotes
advertiser content on Digg, a cognizable endorsement under the
Guides has occurred.
Moreover, as discussed above, in the social media context the
fundamental question is whether, viewed objectively, "the
relationship between the advertiser and the speaker is such that the
speaker's statement can be considered 'sponsored' by the advertiser
and therefore an 'advertising message."'o A social media vote on an
aggregator site is the functional equivalent of making the statement
"check out this interesting content" to all fellow social media
participants. When such a statement is paid for by an advertiser
99. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 67.
100. Of course, this analogy is a simplification because it ignores the "wisdom of the
crowd" phenomenon that aggregators like Digg harness. A single "digg" on Digg or a
single "favorite" of a YouTube video will not propel the content to the front page of these
sites. It is the aggregation of many votes from many different social media participants
that does so, and this would equate under the analogy to one pamphlateer handing a
pamphlet to one passerby.
101. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 8.
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within the context of an overall marketing campaign, it is
undoubtedly "sponsored" within the meaning of the Guides.1 2
Assuming social media participants who are paid for specified
votes and actions are "endorsers" within the meaning of the Guides,
the next question is whether the connection between advertiser and
endorser must be disclosed under Section 255.5. Here, the answer is
more straightforward. It is incumbent on an endorser to disclose any
connection he or she has with an advertiser that "might materially
affect the weight or credibility of the endorsement."11 Visitors go to
aggregator sites like Digg because they trust the collective intelligence
of the community to surface the most interesting, engaging, or
important content. The knowledge that some fellow diggers have a
relationship with advertisers and that they promote content on Digg
on the basis of that relationship would materially affect the weight
and credibility visitors accord the illegitimate content. As such, the
test under Section 255.5 is met. Paid social media endorsers should
be required to disclose their relationship with advertisers. Moreover,
the Guides indicate that advertisers-and presumably by extension
third party intermediaries such a Subvert and Profit-are required to
advise endorsers of their duty to disclose material connections under
Section 5, as well as take reasonable steps to monitor endorser
conduct to ensure compliance with all disclosure requirements. 4
VI. Conclusion
"Black markets" in social media votes and actions have in no
way reached critical mass. The number of sponsored "tweets,"
"diggs," and "favorites" on any given day no doubt represents a
miniscule portion of the vast, burgeoning sea of authentic social
media messages that traverse the globe. Nonetheless, enterprises like
Subvert and Profit should give us pause. While to date social media
platform providers such as Digg have for the most part been
successful in combating those who seek to game the system, there is
no guarantee that this success will continue indefinitely into the
future. As the worldwide market in social media continues to
expand, the financial incentive to subvert for profit will only increase,
as will the sophistication of those who attempt to do so.
102. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 8.
103. 16 C.F.R. § 255.5.
104. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 67, at 39.
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In this regard, the FTC is uniquely positioned to combat the
problem. As we have seen, there are strong arguments that
underground markets in sponsored social media votes and actions
violate Section 5 of the FTC Act, both as it is construed under the
FTC's Policy Statement on Deception and as it is construed under the
FTC's newly revised Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements
and Testimonials in Advertising. Given the substantial public interest
in user trust in the social media context as well as the growing role
played by social media in shaping consumer market decisions, the
FTC would do well to fulfill its broad statutory mandate to protect
the public from deceptive trade practices by investigating and-if and
when it is deemed necessary-regulating "black markets" in social
media votes and actions.
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VII. APPENDIX
Fig. 1: Subvert and Profit - Prices and Earnings
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Fig. 2: Social Media Sites Where Subvert and Profit Operates
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Fig. 3: Subvert and Profit's Firefox Browser Toolbar
http://subvertandprofit.com/content/toolbar
Fig. 4: Instructions for Advertisers
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Fig. 10: Subvert and Profit Web Page - Advertisers and "Social Users"
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